Beyond the 'threshold'? A narrowing view of work equipment

In addition to the coveted coffee machine, paraphernalia in a law firm's office would ordinarily include items such as computers, pens, coloured sticky notes and so forth. Do these items constitute "equipment" for the purposes of work equipment?  What about an office door?  In Chuhan v Dechert LLP, a County Court matter, handed down in April 2025, an associate solicitor, claimant Ms Simish Chuhan, brought a personal injury claim against the defendant, American law firm, Dechert LLP, seeking resolution of this question. 

The Incident

On 21 November 2018, the claimant sustained a traumatic brain injury when the top of a door handle fell off a (heavy fire) door (the Door) and hit her in the head as she pulled it to leave the on-site cafeteria (the Incident).  The crux of the matter was whether the Door or its handle constituted "equipment" under the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (the 1969 Act). 

The claimant was 30 at the time of the Incident, and 36 at trial.  Unable to work following the Incident, the claim for past and future earnings ran into seven figures.  No claims of negligence were made. 

The defendant denied that either the Door or its handle fulfilled the criteria for equipment under the 1969 Act and a detailed analysis of "equipment" ensued at trial.  Given the significance of this issue to the final outcome, the Judge commented it was a shame the equipment matter was not addressed as a formal preliminary issue.

Events leading up to the Incident

By way of background, the Door and handle had been in place for 13 years, having been fitted in 2005.  Although daily visual checks were routinely conducted on specific doors by the facilities engineer, the Door was not one included.  The facilities engineer would, however, have used the Door on a daily basis to check waste pumps (including on the day of the Incident) but did not note it to have been loose.  The claimant herself, did not recall the Door's handle being loose.  The defendant operated a reactive health and safety maintenance system.  On induction, staff learned that they were required to report any defect or maintenance issues, which would include doors, to the London Facilities team.  Such defects or maintenance issues were logged on a computer system with more hazardous problems reported to the landlord's maintenance company by call/email either from the facilities manager or general office team in her absence.  Between 18 January and 30 November 2018, there were 13 reports of loose door handles logged but none in respect of the Door.  The Incident was reported to the facilities engineer as an immediate request on the day so was not recorded on the system.

Part of the defendant's evidence was that the Door was frequently used by staff, including the catering manager (who estimated using it 15-20 times per day).  Despite this, no reports were received in respect of the Door.  A repair to the Door handle was carried out at some point (most likely after installation) as glue had been found on one of the handle's screws (but there was no record of this).

Events following the Incident

On the day of the Incident, the facilities manager contacted the engineer to fix the handle which he did later that day.  He used the same screw and subsequently tested it with his arm.  It was a mystery to him how it happened in the first place.  The defendant asked its specialist door subcontractor to assess the Door handle the following day and the technician duly attended later the same day.  He reported seeing that the Door handle had been fixed and testing showed it working properly. 

The claimant's evidence included a colleague's report of an email received in 2019 which had asked staff to use the back door to the cafeteria not the main door due to an issue with the door handle again. 

Was the Door and its handle "equipment" under the 1969 Act?

Under s1(1)(a) of the 1969 Act, "an employee suffers personal injury in the course of his employment in consequence of a defect in equipment provided by his employer for the purposes of the employer’s business." 

"Equipment" is defined (at s.1(3)) as including, "any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing." 

The claimant argued the Door and its handle constituted "equipment" under the 1969 Act.  She contended the Door handle was defective and caused her injury because the screw securing the handle was too short and the thread was damaged.  In support of her arguments, the claimant relied on a number of sources.  This included an analysis of cases in Brydon v Stewart (1855) 2 Macq 30 (an unsafe pit shaft case), from Munkman on Employers Liability.  In summary, an employer's duty applied whilst an employee is engaged in their employment but extends beyond the actual performance of work and includes activities reasonably incidental to employment, eg entering, leaving or being present on the employer's premises (but may not apply to transport home).  This applies to stairs or washing facilities, even after a worker leaves (Bell v Blackwood Morton & Sons Ltd 1960 SC 11, Ramsay v Wimpey & Co Ltd 1951 SC 692, Davidson v Handley Page Ltd [1945] 1 All ER 235 and McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, HL).  She also relied on Coltman v Bibby Tankers Ltd [1988] AC 276 in which the House of Lords held the entire ship was "equipment" under the 1969 Act and a flagstone was too in Knowles v Liverpool City Council [1993] 1 WLR 1428.

The defendant argued doors are not covered under the Provision and Use of Equipment Regulations 1998 and by design not the 1969 Act as they cover the same thing.  They asserted that these types of Regulations should not overlap unless designed to do so (Mason v Satelcom 2008 EWCA Civ 494 and PRP Architects v Reid 2007 ICR 78 and Heeds v CC of Cleveland Police 2018 EWHC 810).  Also relying on Bibby, referencing equipment being a "chattel" no matter the size so once a door is attached to a building, it becomes part of it and is therefore no longer a chattel. 

Decision

The Judge, HHJ Berkley, accepted there were authorities which considered the definition of equipment; however, with none of them directly comparable, acknowledged this has been a tricky area for other judges. 

On the facts, the Judge preferred the defendant's evidence and held, "equipment" under the 1969 Act, and supporting case law, should be interpreted narrowly and does not include structural elements such as doors or door handles, which may form part of the fabric of an office.  Furthermore, the newer Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act ("ERRA"), which was passed in 2013, did not add anything further in respect of "equipment" under the 1969 Act – if doors are not "equipment" under the former, they will not be under the latter.  In respect of overlap of Regulations, the Judge considered this should be avoided given the authorities on it.            

The Judge found it difficult to describe a plain and ordinary door as "equipment" and, given separate statutory regulations for them, commented Parliament does not consider them to be either.  Also, aside from being in the employer's office building, a door is not there to assist in giving legal advice.  This is not to say a kettle in an office may well be regarded as "equipment", even though it's not linked to providing legal advice but is used in the course of business by staff.  A door, however, does not have a meaningful connection to the employer's business of giving legal advice.         

Key takeaways:

1. Narrower interpretation of "equipment" under the 1969 Act.
2. Generally, building infrastructure should not constitute 'work equipment'.
3. Context is key - what constitutes equipment will be contingent upon the type of work undertaken by the claimant and how the specific item is used.