Contentious Tax Quarterly Review – Autumn 2026

19 November 2026. Published by Adam Craggs, Partner, Head of Tax, Investigations & Financial Crime and Liam McKay, Of Counsel

In this quarterly review we consider three important decisions concerning applications for costs and protective costs orders.

This blog is based on an article written by Adam Craggs and Liam McKay which was published in Tax Journal on 23 September 2026.

Recent decisions

Costs

Two recent FTT decisions on costs have caught our eye. Although arising in different circumstances and reaching different outcomes, both provide useful guidance on when the conduct of tax litigation crosses the line into unreasonableness (and when it does not).

In Colin Sagar v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 01247 (TC), the FTT considered, amongst other things, the taxpayer's applications for costs following HMRC's withdrawal of the decisions which were under appeal. The applications arose from two separate proceedings: an input tax appeal and a penalty appeal.

In relation to the input tax appeal, the taxpayer had provided HMRC with extensive documentation and information during a lengthy compliance check. HMRC nevertheless concluded that he was not entitled to the input tax claimed because the evidence was insufficient to establish the relevant business activities and taxable supplies. That conclusion was upheld by HMRC on internal review and maintained in HMRC’s statement of case after the appeal was notified to the FTT. During the appeal proceedings, HMRC acknowledged that it could not locate several documents the taxpayer had provided to it and requested a further copy. The parties continued preparing for the hearing. Almost two months after the taxpayer had filed his hearing bundle, HMRC informed the FTT that it no longer intended to defend the appeal and withdrew the decision under appeal.

The penalty appeal concerned Personal Liability Notices and associated penalties issued to the taxpayer. Following receipt of the taxpayer's notice of appeal to the FTT, HMRC undertook a review of the matter and concluded that the penalties had been issued in error. HMRC informed the FTT that it did not intend to defend the appeal and withdrew the penalties.

The taxpayer sought his costs for both appeals, on the basis that HMRC had acted unreasonably for the purposes of Rule 10(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (the FTT Rules). 

The FTT determined that HMRC had acted unreasonably in the conduct of the input tax appeal in that HMRC had failed to identify and properly evaluate information already available to it. The FTT considered that, once HMRC was notified of the appeal, it was "required to undertake a proper and rigorous review of the dispute", which was an obligation that "forms part of the ordinary standard of conduct expected of a public authority engaged in litigation". Having undertaken such a review, HMRC ought reasonably to have appreciated that the taxpayer had previously provided it with material documents and information. Instead, HMRC continued to seek production of material already in its possession and continued to defend the appeal on the basis that relevant information had not been supplied. The FTT found that such conduct fell outside the range of conduct reasonably to be expected of a litigant conducting proceedings before the FTT and that the taxpayer was entitled to a costs order as a result.

The FTT reached a different conclusion in respect of the penalties appeal, finding that HMRC had not acted unreasonably in that appeal. In reaching that conclusion, the FTT placed weight on the fact that HMRC undertook a review of the decision shortly after receipt of the notice of appeal, and withdrew shortly after concluding that the penalties had been issued in error and before filing a statement of case and before putting the taxpayer to the burden of meeting a substantive defence. The FTT determined that, in contrast to HMRC's conduct in the input tax appeal, its conduct in the penalties appeal fell within the range of conduct reasonably open to a litigant.

In Isaac v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 01227 (TC), the FTT considered HMRC's application for costs against the taxpayer under Rule 10(1)(b) of the FTT Rules and, in the alternative, its application for a wasted costs order against the taxpayer's representatives under Rule 10(1)(a) of the FTT Rules.

In September 2022, the taxpayer lodged with the FTT his appeal, together with an application for permission to appeal out of time. The decision under challenge and the grounds of appeal are not apparent from the FTT’s decision. However, in April 2023, the FTT drew the parties’ attention to its decision in Northwood v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 00351 (TC), which it considered relevant to the proceedings, and invited their submissions on how the appeal should proceed. Northwood concerned an appeal against closure notices disallowing deductions claimed in respect of contributions to a remuneration trust. It therefore appears that the appeal in Isaac concerned the same or similar arrangements. Despite the decision in Northwood, the taxpayer confirmed that he wished to pursue his appeal, and professional advisers were instructed to represent him in the appeal shortly thereafter.

The taxpayer's application for permission to bring a late appeal was listed for hearing in January 2026. The parties exchanged skeleton arguments one week before the hearing. HMRC's position was that the taxpayer's arrangements were materially indistinguishable from those considered in Northwood and that the appeal had no realistic prospect of success, while the taxpayer maintained his application. However, three days before the hearing, the taxpayer notified the FTT that he wished to withdraw his appeal on the basis of his personal financial position.

HMRC subsequently applied for costs. Its primary case was that, once the FTT had drawn Northwood to the parties’ attention in April 2023, it should have been apparent to the taxpayer and his advisers that the appeal had no realistic prospect of success. HMRC therefore argued that the taxpayer’s continued pursuit of the appeal, followed by withdrawal of the appeal shortly before the hearing, amounted to unreasonable conduct, for the purposes of Rule 10(1)(b) of the FTT Rules. Alternatively, HMRC contended that the taxpayer’s advisers had acted improperly, unreasonably and/or negligently, for the purposes of Rule 10(1)(a), by continuing the proceedings after assuming conduct of the case, failing properly to engage with the implications of Northwood, and raising further matters shortly before the hearing which caused HMRC to incur additional costs. The taxpayer opposed the applications, maintaining that his withdrawal had been prompted by financial considerations and the personal impact on him of the ongoing litigation. He also contended that Northwood was not determinative because there were potentially material distinctions between the two cases, and that neither he nor his advisers had acted unreasonably by pursuing the appeal until the decision to withdraw was made.

The FTT dismissed both of HMRC’s applications, concluding that neither the taxpayer nor his advisers had acted improperly or unreasonably in their conduct of the appeal. As regards the taxpayer, the FTT was not satisfied that HMRC had established that the appeal was withdrawn because he accepted that it was bound to fail, rather than due to his financial circumstances. Although the FTT accepted that the appeal could have been withdrawn sooner, it rejected HMRC’s contention that it was materially indistinguishable from Northwood and therefore bound to fail. The decision in Northwood comprised both findings of fact based on the evidence in that particular appeal and conclusions on various issues of law. The taxpayer was entitled to rely on his own evidence in relation to those matters, and the findings in Northwood did not necessarily determine how the same issues would be resolved in a different case. Accordingly, HMRC had not established that the taxpayer’s decision to continue the appeal fell outside the range of reasonable conduct.

With regard to the conduct of the taxpayer’s advisers, the FTT was not satisfied that Northwood rendered the appeal so obviously hopeless that no reasonable representative could properly have continued to pursue the appeal. The advisers could not be criticised merely for taking a different view of the merits from HMRC. Nor did amendments advanced shortly before the hearing amount to a significant breach of professional obligations, vexatious conduct, or a failure to exercise the competence reasonably expected of a professional representative. The FTT therefore found no basis for concluding that the advisers had acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, for the purposes of Rule 10(1)(a) of the FTT Rules.

The FTT's decisions in Sagar and Isaac illustrate how superficially similar cases can produce different outcomes on costs. In each case, the underlying appeal was withdrawn shortly before the substantive hearing, after the parties had incurred significant costs, and the successful party sought to characterise the other’s continued pursuit of the proceedings as unreasonable. Yet withdrawal, even at a late stage, does not, of itself, establish unreasonable conduct. In Isaac, HMRC could not show that the appeal had become so obviously hopeless that its continued pursuit fell outside the range of reasonable conduct. In Sagar, the relevant failing was that HMRC had continued to defend the appeal despite already holding material evidence that a proper review of the case should have identified. The contrast between the two cases demonstrates that the FTT will focus closely on what the party knew, or ought reasonably to have known, at each stage of the proceedings and whether its conduct, not merely the merits of its case, crossed the threshold into unreasonableness.

Costs will nevertheless remain a particularly contentious area in the FTT. Many taxpayers and advisers will recognise the circumstances in Sagar, where HMRC maintains a position well into the appeal process, only to withdraw shortly before, or even at the door of the FTT, leaving the taxpayer with a substantial, and often irrecoverable, costs bill. Although Sagar confirms that HMRC may be held to account where its conduct of the litigation is unreasonable, it does not establish any general right to recover costs following a late withdrawal. The practical lesson is that taxpayers seeking costs should maintain a clear record of the relevant evidence, explain why HMRCs position is no longer reasonably sustainable, and invite HMRC to reconsider its position before further costs are incurred. Equally, Isaac is a reminder that a taxpayer, and indeed their advisers, will not act unreasonably merely because they assess the merits differently from HMRC, or ultimately decide not to proceed with the appeal. Other than in appeals that have been allocated as Complex by the FTT (in which costs generally follow the event, unless the taxpayer has opted out of the costs regime), the FTT's costs jurisdiction is directed at unreasonable conduct, not at punishing a party simply for losing, changing its position, or withdrawing its case.

Protective Costs Orders

In HMRC v Wardle [2026] UKUT 00335 (TCC), the UT considered the taxpayer's application for a protective costs order (PCO) (a court direction that limits or caps how much an unsuccessful party has to pay toward their opponent's legal fees) in respect of HMRC's appeal from the decision of the FTT in Wardle v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 00543 (TC). The FTT's decision concerned the taxpayer's entitlement to Entrepreneurs' Relief (now Business Asset Disposal Relief) on his disposal of an interest in an LLP.  The principal issue in the appeal was the date on which the LLP had commenced its trade. 

In evaluating the taxpayer's application, the UT noted the principles set down in Drummond v HMRC [2016] UKUT 221 (TCC) and R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [2005] Civ 192. Those principles provide that a PCO may be made at any stage of the proceedings provided that the court is satisfied that:

  • the issues raised are of general public importance;
  • the public interest requires that those issues should be resolved;
  • the applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the case;
  • having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent(s) and to the amount of costs that are likely to be involved, it is fair and just to make the order; and
  • if the order is not made the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings and will be acting reasonably in so doing.

Applying those principles, although expressing some reservation, the UT proceeded on the basis that the appeal involved a matter of general public importance.

The UT accepted HMRC's submission that the public interest did not require the UT to determine the issues in the appeal (that was because, in Putney Power Ltd v HMRC [UKUT] 105 (TCC), the UT had already given authoritative guidance on the question in issue, such that there was no real public interest in requiring the UT to determine the question of when the trade commenced on the facts of the taxpayer's particular case).

The UT concluded that although the taxpayer had a clear private interest in the outcome of the appeal, given he was seeking to recover tax he argued ought not to have been paid, the existence of that private interest was not a bar to a PCO, but it was a factor to take into account in exercising its discretion as to whether to make a PCO. The UT also observed that the appeal did not concern a purely private interest given the public interest in taxpayers paying the right amount of tax and in HMRC collecting the right amount of tax.

The UT noted that HMRC was well resourced and that the taxpayer had chosen not to rely on evidence as to his financial position, but simply stated that his resources were limited to his personal savings and therefore, in the absence of any evidence as to his means, the UT inferred that the taxpayer would be able to meet a liability for costs if HMRC's appeal was successful.

The taxpayer stated that it would not be prudent for him to continue defending the appeal in the absence of a PCO because he would face the risk of an uncapped adverse costs order and he would therefore have little practical alternative but to cease defending the appeal such that, in practice, HMRC’s appeal would be conceded; the UT considered that this statement fell short of a clear indication that he would withdraw from the appeal, and was therefore not satisfied that, in the absence of a PCO, it was likely that the taxpayer would withdraw from the proceedings.

Having considered each of the above factors, the UT then considered whether it was fair and just to make a PCO, taking all of the circumstances into account. In concluding that it would not be appropriate to make a PCO, the UT noted that the absence of any real public interest in determining when the trade commenced on the facts of the taxpayer's particular case, and the fact that the taxpayer would be able to meet a liability for costs, weighed most heavily in the balance. The UT therefore refused the taxpayer's application. 

Wardle is notable because applications for protective costs orders are relatively rare in tax appeals. The case highlights the disparity between HMRC’s substantial resources and those of most taxpayers, particularly an unrepresented individual. Faced with an appeal by HMRC and the prospect of a substantial adverse costs order, a taxpayer with limited resources may have little  choice in practice other than to concede, even where there is genuine merit in defending the FTT’s decision. That imbalance risks making access to appellate justice depend less on the strength of the taxpayer’s case than on their ability to absorb the financial risk.

The position is particularly unsatisfactory because HMRC’s reasons for appealing often extend beyond securing a different outcome against the individual taxpayer. As a public authority, HMRC has wider responsibilities to the general taxpaying population and may seek to establish or preserve a point of principle for its application in other cases. A taxpayer may therefore find themselves funding the defence of an appeal whose broader policy significance to HMRC far outweighs the practical importance of that taxpayer’s own liability. Nevertheless, Wardle highlights that unfairness is not, without more, sufficient to justify a protective costs order. Instead, taxpayers seeking such an order must address the applicable criteria, supporting their application with clear evidence. In that regard, the decision in Wardle provides an instructive example of how the UT will consider the relevant legal test and apply it to the facts of the individual case before it.

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