Falling Fowl in personal injury claims: the Animals Act 1971, fundamental dishonesty, quantum and forum shopping

Whether you're dealing with claims under the Animals Act 1971, fundamental dishonesty, quantum disputes or what forum to choose, Boyd v Hughes [2025] deals with it all. Here we discuss the principles before the court in a claim that arose out of a personal injury claim after a fall from a horse and what it means for personal injury cases going forwards.

The claim

The claimant was employed as a rider and a stable hand for the defendant, whose business was as a racehorse breeder and trainer. The claimant was an experienced horse rider and at the time of the incident was riding a horse known as 'Foxy'. It was the claimant's case that Foxy was known to shy/jink and did so on this occasion, causing her to fall off and suffer an injury.

The claimant's case was brought under the Animals Act 1971, alleging the defendant's strict liability under section 2(2). The defendant denied liability and alleged the claimant was fundamentally dishonest in the presentation of her injuries and ongoing disability. The claimant refuted that allegation and pleaded she had not exaggerated the effects of the accident. The defendant also sought clarification that payments made to the claimant under the Racing Industry Accident Benefit Scheme, ought to be taken into account in any award for damages.

The Animals Act 1971

 The Animals Act 1971 creates strict liability for damage done by animals. However, its drafting has been much criticised, with even Lord Denning having commented that the Act was "very cumbrously worded and will give rise to several difficulties in the future". Ormrod J described it as using "remarkably opaque language …" The wording of the Act clearly vexed the parties and the court in this case, resulting in a judgment running to 100 pages

The key clause is section 2(2), which states:
"Where damage is caused by an animal which does not belong to a dangerous species, a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage, except as otherwise provided by this Act, if—

1. the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which, if caused by the animal, was likely to be severe; and

    

2. the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances; and

    

3. those characteristics were known to that keeper or were at any time known to a person who at that time had charge of the animal as that keeper’s servant or, where that keeper is the head of a household, were known to another keeper of the animal who is a member of that household and under the age of sixteen[SL1][GR2]."

The judge drew attention to the leading authority for claims under the Animals Act 1971, which was the House of Lords decision in Mirvahedy v Henley [2003][SL3].

In terms of (a), 'damage' under Section 11 is defined as 'death or injury to any person including any disease and any impairment of physical or mental condition'. For the purposes of this case, the judge held that 'under restraint' was not comparable to the use of ordinary riding equipment but was more akin to fixed leashes or chains on a dog.

It was also held to be important not to assess the 'likely to cause' or 'likely to be severe' element with hindsight and therefore just because a claimant had suffered an injury does not mean that it was likely to cause an injury. It was clear to the court that if a rider falls from a horse, then it is possible for that rider to suffer an injury. However, distinction was drawn between when a rider falls from a horse that 'rears' up and one that 'shys/jinks', the former often resulting in a rider falling and suffering an injury and the latter being unusual for a rider to fall. As the two are different from each other, the likelihood of damage and the likelihood of that damage being severe, was therefore different. The Judge confirmed it was important to assess the particular circumstances of the fall, namely whether the fall happened on tarmac, on a road or, as in the claimant's case, on the defendant's gallop which was a horse-shoe shape with a carpet fibre surface. Upon consideration of the vast amount of evidence before the court, the judge was not satisfied that the criteria for (a) had been reached. The judge determined that it was a possibility that a rider could fall if a horse shied or jinked whilst being ridden, but this was not likely, and it was not likely that they would suffer (or reasonably be expected) to suffer a severe injury.

Even though the Judge deemed the claimant's claim had not satisfied this element and therefore the claim would fail, the judge gave a detailed analysis on the other subsections of the act.

The correct interpretation of sub-section (b) is notoriously unclear and the court in this case described it as ambiguous, highlighting the two possible competing interpretations discussed by their lordships in Mirvahedy:

1. There are two relevant types of potential damage that attract liability: (i) risk of damage due to characteristics not usually found in animals of the same species; and (ii) risk of damage due to normal characteristics of animals of the same species, but only a specific times or under certain conditions. Presumably the claimant only needs to satisfy one to make our their claim for damages under the section (assuming the other criteria are met).
2. There is only one type of damage that gives rise to liability; ie that which was 'likely or likely to be severe, because of characteristics not normally found in animals of the same species even if they were found in such animals at particularly times or in particular circumstances'[SL4] (emphasis added).

The judge adopted the latter interpretation of s2(2)(b).

Much evidence was heard as to the particular characteristics of Foxy. The Judge indicated there were issues with the Claimant's evidence in this regard. The Claimant claimed Foxy was prone to shying/jinking and would 'shy at a blade of grass' therefore constituting specific characteristics not usual to horses. However, upon consideration of all the evidence presented, the Judge disagreed, drawing the conclusion that, if this were accurate, then a number of riders would have fallen from Foxy on multiple occasions, including the Claimant.  The judge found that Foxy did not possess any characteristics that were not usually found in horses. 

When considering whether horses of Foxy's type typically shy or jink at particular times or circumstances, the judge again distinguished between a horse that bucks or rears when it is frightened or perceives a threat and a movement sideways in response to something that a horse hears or sees. The judge also explained that, with horses, this can happen at 'very many times and in very many circumstances', therefore it was held that this behaviour was not sufficiently rare to attract liability under s2(2)(b). Having established that Foxy had no special characteristics which increased the risk of damage, it was not necessary to consider sub-section (c): who knew about her characteristics.

Strict liability regimes are often perceived as attractive to claimants; however, what we can take from the above analysis is that cases brought under the strict liability regime of the Animals Act 1971 are by no means simple. Consideration must be given to the animal in question, the characteristics of that animal and whether they are characteristics of the species or the particular animal, alongside the type of damage alleged. Much of the analysis will be fact specific; not just in relation to the particular circumstances of the accident, but also in relation to the usual characteristics of the species and circumstances – something which will often be the subject of expert evidence.

Fundamental dishonesty

 In recent months we have seen an increasing number of claims seeking to be defended on the basis that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest. Under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 Section 51 (1), it states that, "if the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest in relation to the primary claim or related claim, the court must dismiss the primary claim, unless it is satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice if the claim were dismissed".

The burden of proof here is on the defendant to establish the claimant's dishonesty. The leading case is Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Limited (t/a Crockfords Club), which sets out the test for determining whether the claimant has been dishonest. The test is a combined subjective/objective test which asks whether, in light of the claimant's knowledge or belief of the facts, reasonably honest people would consider the claimant's actions dishonest.

Once that has been determined, the court must then decide whether that dishonesty is fundamental to the primary or related claim.  Upon considering the vast caselaw in this area, the judge referred to previous questions that he had himself set down in the case of Muyepa:

1. when did the dishonest conduct start?
2. 'Does the dishonesty taint the whole of the claim or is it limited to a divisible element?' and
3. What is the comparison between the dishonestly inflated claim and the underlying value of the claim?

In summary, the court must decide whether the dishonesty goes to the heart of the claim, and how it impacts the sums claimed.

In consideration of the evidence given by the claimant, both to the experts in their examination and her witness evidence and cross-examination at trial, the judge found the Claimant to be dishonest. The Claimant had exaggerated the restrictions to her movements to the experts and stated her disability to be such that she could not comb her hair, do any significant cooking, walk her dogs in her right hand etc. The claimant also failed to inform either expert that she had resumed football and rugby training in 2020.

The judge went through the three questions referred to above, from Muyepa and, whilst it was clear the claimant had dishonesty exaggerated her disability and had not represented her recovery accurately before the court, that exaggeration/dishonesty could not realistically inflate part of her claim, other than that of suffering and loss of amenity. The judge maintained that 'the core of heart of the claim remained unaffected by the exaggeration'. Elements that were considered in reaching that conclusion were the fact that the claimant was not making a claim for continuing care or equipment and that the schedule remained largely the same throughout the course of the litigation. The claimant was still taking painkillers, was restricted in her movement (even if this was not as severe as she had claimed) and she was unable to work with horses.  The judge deemed the claim a 'dishonest embellishment in an attempt to underpin an essentially honest claim'.

What was clear from the judgment is the power of surveillance and photographic evidence in alleging arguments of fundamental dishonesty. That evidence must prove that the dishonesty goes to root of the claim, thereby undermining the claimant's claim. In addition, this evidence must be considered in light of what the claimant is seeking to recover. As discussed in this case, the elements where the claimant was found to have been dishonest did not significantly change the amounts she was seeking. Had the claimant been seeking ongoing care requirements and equipment etc, the judge may have found differently. It is therefore important to closely examine the extent of the injury the claimant is claiming and how this impacts the amounts they are seeking to recover from the defendant, alongside whether this is supported by surveillance and/or witness evidence.

Quantum

As with the liability and dishonesty elements of the claim, quantum was also in dispute. One of the main issues were whether the payments the claimant had received from the Racing Industry Accident Benefit Scheme (RIABS) should be credited against any damages awarded to reduce the defendant's liability.

The judge held that the payment should be credited within the claim and that there were two exceptions to the rule against double recovery, which fall under the case of Parry v Cleaver [1970]: the benevolence exception and insurance monies. The judge held that the payments from this scheme could not be classified as the same as payments by third parties out of sympathy. The judge referred to Lord Justice Dyson's comments in Gaca at paragraph 56 where he said: "the insurance monies must be deducted unless it is shown that the claimant paid or contributed to the insurance premium directly or indirectly". The judge confirmed that the claimant, whilst aware of the scheme, was not making any contribution herself to it and it was a 'perk' of her employment. As such, the damages that would have been payable by the defendant (had the claim succeeded) would have been reduced to reflect the £77,159.23 that the claimant received from RIABS.

One other point to note from the quantum arguments in the case, was the claimant's claim for her loss of employment. The claimant was initially seeking £20,000; however, the judge deemed that she was unlikely to be able to ride professionally past the age of 50 and therefore limited the award to £2,750.

Final criticisms by the judge

After giving the judgment, the judge also made many criticisms of the case. The first was that consideration should have been given to having a trial of liability as a preliminary issue. Particularly criticism in this regard was given because the cases cited in respect of the claim under the Animals Act 1971, had done precisely that: been decided at the trial of a preliminary issue. This should have alerted the parties to the fact that this would have been an appropriate way of dealing with the case at the first Case Management hearing.

The second significant criticism was that the parties had not given due consideration to the appropriate forum for the claim. For the judge, this was the Cardiff County Court, particularly given the parties were 'relatively close' to Cardiff and the claim was valued at under £500,000. The reasons for the forum selection by the parties, such as the remote evidence abilities of the high court being preferable, were inadequate, particularly given the issues with some of the remote evidence and not being able to hear witnesses adequately.

Key Takeaways

• Always remember the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish fundamental dishonesty. Not only does the defendant need to prove, on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has been dishonest, but that the dishonesty is fundamental to the claim or part of the claim. It will be important for defendant's representatives to manage their client's expectations: even if evidence appears to reveal the claimant's honesty, if it is mere exaggeration, it will not be fatal to the claim.
• Surveillance evidence can be extremely useful in supporting fundamental dishonesty arguments. This should be considered in light of the expert's evidence and claimant's claim as to the level of injury suffered and the claimant's recovery.
• Consider whether the extent of the dishonesty goes to the heart of the claim and whether it impacts the amounts the claimant is seeking.
• Consider the value of the claim – should it be listed in a different court? If it is less than £500,000 it should be issued in a county court.
• Consider how you will be able to justify issuing in the High Court. In this case, the claimant's argument of remote evidence being preferable/better in the High Court was not borne out as there were difficulties in hearing evidence from some of the witnesses
• Consideration should have been given to a trial of liability as a preliminary issue as each of the cases that had been cited to the judge had done so. Failure to do so can result in cost consequences and criticism from the court
• The litigation should be managed in an objectively reasonable way (and heard in a District Registry if that is proximate to the parties) and not organised for the convenience of the solicitor or counsel team. In particular, parties should bear in mind whether they will be able to recover the costs of instructing solicitors in London when local solicitors would have been available.