Lawyers’ liability, when is a claim "brought" and limitation traps - Lukins v Quality Part X Ltd

The decision in Lukins v Quality Part X Ltd Ravensale Ltd [2026] EWHC 301 (KB) is a stark illustration of how procedural missteps around electronic filing can expose solicitors to lost litigation claims.

The underlying claim concerned loss and damage caused by a 2018 fire at commercial premises in Wembley.  It was not disputed that under s.2 of the Limitation Act 1980, limitation expired on 6 April 2024 – 6 years from the date of the fire.

On 25 March 2024, the claimants’ solicitors posted multiple copies of the claim form to the King’s Bench Division by way of a special delivery letter with instructions to deduct the court fee from their PBA account. The letter was received and signed for on 26 March 2024.

However, since 1 July 2019, Practice Direction 51O had made CE‑File mandatory for legally represented parties starting claims in the Central Office of the King's Bench Division, the Court staff promptly returned the claim forms on 28 March, explaining that paper filing would not be accepted. For what the judgment records as 'reasons unknown', the solicitors did not receive that letter until 9 April and the claim was then issued via CE‑File on 9 April 2024.

The defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that the claims were out of time for limitation purposes.  The claimants resisted the applications on the basis that the claims were brought when the court received the claim form, or in the alternative, the Court should exercise its power to remedy any error of procedure pursuant to CPR r.3.10.  The Court granted summary judgment against the claimants.

The “all that could reasonably be expected” standard

The Court considered the leading authorities on when an action is “brought” for limitation purposes. Under CPR r.7.2(a) proceedings are started when a court issues a claim form, but CPR PD7A 6.1 modifies CPR r.7.2 in certain circumstances such that proceedings are brought when the claim form as issued was received in the court office. Then CPR r.7.12 provides that a practice direction may permit or require a claimant to start a claim by requesting the issue of a claim form electronically.  CPR PD51O provided for an electronic working pilot scheme to operate in the Central Office of the King's Bench Division in proceedings started after 1 January 2019 and CPR PD51O broadly provided that where a party is legally represented Electronic Working must be used by that party to start and/or continue any relevant claims or applications.

The general principle is that, for an action to be brought, a claimant must show they have done “at least all that could reasonably be expected of him in order to ensure that proceedings are issued within time” and "what is reasonable will depend on factors such as the requirements set by the rules and practice directions, whether the claimant is legally represented, and the content and timing of any communication he has had with the court with regards to issuing the claim" (paragraph 62).

In applying this to the facts, the Court emphasised that PD51O’s mandatory e‑filing requirement had been in place “for over five years. The Claimants’ solicitors should have been familiar with it. Plainly they were not.” In those circumstances, the claimants had not done all that could reasonably be expected (or all that was in their power) to start proceedings in time.

Paper filing did not “save” limitation

The claimants argued that they had “brought” the claim in time when the paper forms were received on 26 March 2024 and they relied on PD7A 6.1 (backdating to receipt of the claim form) arguing that the court staff should have issued the claim or scanned it themselves.

The court rejected these arguments and confirmed that PD7A 6.1 operates against the backdrop of the current procedural regime. PD51O requires represented parties to start claims via CE‑File and therefore, sending a paper claim form is simply not taking the “necessary step required to enable the proceedings to be started”. The analogy with litigants in person also fails because a litigant in person posting a claim form is carrying out what the rules allow, and so it is open to them to rely on PD7A 6.1; a represented party doing the same is ignoring a mandatory requirement and acting unreasonably.

No CPR 3.10 safety net for pre‑issue errors

The claimants also argued CPR r.3.10 and PD51O 5.3 as a way to “remedy” their failure and treat the claim as brought in time. The court held that CPR r.3.10 “can provide no remedy unless there are proceedings extant at the time of the procedural error. There were no proceedings in existence at the time that the Claimants failed to comply, so it cannot apply” (Para 68)); and that it cannot abrogate the limitation period contained in primary legislation.

This judgment provides a good example of the importance of complying with the CPR and court procedures and always ensuring that claims are issued well before the limitation deadlines Ignorance cannot be excused and errors are left at the feet of the solicitors, not the court.