General Liability newsletter – August 2026

Welcome to the latest edition of our general liability newsletter, looking at the latest trending stories and updates insurers should be aware of.

Judicial College Guidelines: what’s new in the 18th Edition

The 18th Edition of the Judicial College Guidelines (JCG) was published on 09/04/2026. While the overall structure will feel familiar, there are several points worth noting for anyone valuing or negotiating general damages.

Inflation uplift: RPI to August 2025 (8.26%)

The headline change is the inflationary uplift applied across the guideline brackets. The figures in the 18th Edition have been updated by reference to the Retail Prices Index (RPI) but only using the RPI figure as at August 2025 (407.7). This produces an 8.26% uplift on the figures in the 17th Edition.

The latest available RPI figure can be found on the ONS website in the “RPI All Items Index” section. In practice, and consistent with an approach increasingly seen on assessment, any further inflationary adjustment beyond August 2025 can be argued when inviting the court to assess damages by reference to the Guidelines.

A reminder on older awards: inflation updates and Simmons v Castle

The Guidelines also reiterate the need for care when updating awards of general damages from older authorities. Reported cases are often presented as having been uplifted for inflation, but that does not necessarily mean they reflect the impact of Simmons v Castle and the associated 10% uplift. The message is a familiar one, but it remains a common pitfall, particularly when parties are comparing historic case law with current JCG brackets.

Chapter 3: epilepsy terminology and revised bracket

There are notable changes to the epilepsy section in Chapter 3. The outdated references to “grand mal” and “petit mal” have been removed, replaced with more clinically accurate terminology: generalised motor (tonic-clonic) seizures and focal seizures.

The bracket for established epilepsy is now presented as a single wide range: £72,440 to £198,320. The breadth of this bracket suggests it may be refined in future editions as further case data develops.

Chapter 6: new guidance for miscarriage

A further addition is a new section on miscarriage in Chapter 6. Chapter 6(F)(g) provides for awards of £2,750 to £17,000, with valuation dependent on factors including:

• the duration of pain and discomfort;
• the stage of pregnancy when the miscarriage occurred; and
• any subsequent difficulties in conceiving.

Any other major changes?

On first review, there do not appear to be many other significant updates beyond those highlighted above. That said, even where brackets are not materially altered, the JCG’s editorial commentary can be influential in negotiation and on assessment.

Spam today, out of time tomorrow

In the recent case of Berow v Maidstone Borough Council a notice sent by email by a local authority was deemed to be valid service.

Although the case arose from a local authority licensing decision, it carries wider operational lessons for businesses and public bodies that: (i) send formal notices; and (ii) rely on recipients acting within tight time limits. For insurers, it is also a useful “service and deadline” reference point when late challenges lead to loss claims, third-party disputes, or professional negligence allegations.

What happened?

A local authority revoked a driver’s dual private hire/hackney carriage licence. It emailed the written decision (with reasons and appeal information) to the driver on 2 September 2024, copying the driver’s solicitor. The authority had an electronic “delivery receipt” email which indicated that the email was accepted by the destination systems (described in court as a technical “handshake”).

The statutory appeal deadline was 21 days from service of the decision notice. The driver appealed late, arguing service was not effective because the 2 September 2024 email went into his spam folder and he did not see it. The driver asserted that his spam emails are deleted after one month. The driver's solicitors argued this was the equivalent of a letter that is never delivered. The Magistrates’ Court dismissed the appeal as out of time; the High Court upheld that outcome.

What was decided?

1.) Email can be valid service even where a statute does not spell it out.

On the facts, the court accepted that email can still be valid service under the common law even if the statute does not list email as a permitted method. So, you should not assume that silence in the statute removes the risk that an emailed notice will count as served.

2.) “Receipt” is not the same as “I read it”.

The court emphasised that notice can be effective when the recipient has the opportunity to acquaint themselves with it. A person cannot necessarily avoid consequences by saying they did not open the email (or did not look for it).

3.) Spam folder arguments are evidence-heavy and fact-sensitive.

The court was sceptical about the credibility of the spam narrative on the procedural route taken (a case stated appeal) and, in any event, held that even if the email went to spam, it could still amount to receipt in context. A key factor in reaching this conclusion was that the driver had previously communicated with the authority by email and there was no reason to suggest the email would have gone into the driver's spam folder if the others had not and/or why the diver did not think they would receive an email with the decision. Ultimately, nothing in the decision turned on these arguments.

Practical implications of the decision

• Treat regulatory/authority emails as “time-critical” by default. Missed windows can create knock-on losses and disputes.
• Build defensible mailbox controls. Monitor spam folders, avoid aggressive auto-deletion, and use shared inboxes for formal notices.
• Keep an audit trail. It is best practice to retain emails, attachments, headers and delivery receipts, especially if there is a chance that decisions may be contested.
• If you serve notices by email, assume proof will matter. Delivery receipts can support your case that an email got through, but disagreements can still arise about whether it was sent to the right address, whether it bounced, or where it ended up in the recipient’s mailbox (eg, spam or another folder).

Email service slip-up proves fatal: TCC strikes out late-served claim form

In Coal Pension Properties Ltd v Mace Living Ltd Ors [2026] EWHC 1248 (TCC) (26 May 2026), the Technology and Construction Court reiterated the strict rules of CPR Part 6 on service of a claim form and DHCJ Roger Ter Haar KC dismissed the claimant’s application for relief (including under CPR 6.15) and granted the defendants’ declarations, including that the court lacked jurisdiction.

What happened?

The parties’ solicitors exchanged extensive pre-action correspondence and agreed a series of stays/consent orders. Those orders ultimately extended the deadline for serving the claim form to 02/02/2026.

Although the claim form (issued 23/12/2021) stated the Defendants’ address for service as their registered office, the Claimant did not serve there. Instead, at 16:46 on 02/02/2026, Claimant solicitors emailed the Defendant's representatives, purporting to serve the claim form, particulars of claim and initial disclosure. That email was the only dispatch of the claim documents before midnight.

Defendant solicitors responded two days later stating it had no record of agreeing to accept service by email and reserved its position. Further physical delivery attempts followed on 04/02/2026 and late on 05/02/2026.

The claimant argued that service by email on 02/02/2026 was good, raising three main points:

1. Authority under CPR 6.7: had Defendant solicitors notified in writing that it was authorised to accept service of the claim form?
2. Email footer (Covid-era): did their earlier footer (stating service “should be made only by email” until further notice) make email service valid?
3. Replacement footer: if the footer had changed, what effect did the replacement wording (and any conditions) have?

A central theme was that a solicitor’s general involvement in a dispute (including agreeing extensions and corresponding) is not the same as being authorised to accept service of proceedings.

The claimant relied on a draft N244 (sent in July 2023 as part of extension/stay discussions) in which Defendant solicitors provided an address and email details for documents “about this application”. The claimant said this amounted (objectively construed) to written notification that Defendant solicitors were instructed to accept service of the claim form.

The court rejected this and took the view that the N244 was not a CPR 6.7 notification of authority to accept service of the claim form.

The judge drew close parallels with LSREF 3 Tiger Falkirk Ltd I S.a.r.L. v Paragon Building Consultancy Ltd [2021] EWHC 2063 (TCC), where Fraser J held that agreeing extensions and emailing about the dispute did not amount to notification of authority to accept service. The court also relied on the principle (seen in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12 and Personal Management Solutions Ltd v Gee 7 Group Ltd [2016] EWHC 891 (Ch)) that authority to accept service is not implied simply because solicitors are acting.

The claimant also relied on Defendant solicitor’s earlier Covid-era footer suggesting claim forms and other documents “should be made only by email” during disruption.

The court held this did not cure service: even if a footer indicates willingness to accept service electronically (PD 6A paragraph 4.1), that does not automatically satisfy the separate requirement under CPR 6.7 for written notification that the solicitor is authorised to accept service of the claim form. The court also emphasised PD 6A paragraph 4.2 in that the serving party should ask whether there are limits to acceptance by electronic means.

From around July 2022, the Defendant's solicitor's footer changed. The replacement wording requested electronic correspondence and said email service should be via a specific service email address (copying the conduct lawyer), “subject to the restrictions set out here”.

The judge accepted that this displaced the earlier “until further notice” Covid footer and rejected the argument that a service notification cannot be retracted/amended.

In any event, the claimant’s key service email on 02/02/2026 was not sent to the specified service address, providing a further reason it did not comply with PD 6A.

Having failed to establish valid service, the claimant sought retrospective validation under CPR 6.15.

The court refused, applying the principles summarised by Carr LJ in The Good Law Project v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355, including:

• whether the claimant took reasonable steps to serve in accordance with the rules;
• whether the defendant knew the contents of the claim form in time (important, but not determinative); and
• prejudice to the defendant, including loss of a limitation defence.

  The claimant had not taken reasonable steps as they had not obtained clear confirmation of authority to accept service, did not check limits on email service, and left service until the last moment. Although the defendants knew the content of the claim form in time, that alone was not “good reason”.

Prejudice also mattered given that the defendants had a well-arguable limitation defence in contract and negligence, and validation would deprive them of it. The court stressed that CPR 6.15 is not a general safety net for avoidable, last-minute service errors.

Outcome

• Email service on 02/02/2026 was not valid.
• The claimant’s application (including CPR 6.15 relief) was dismissed.
• The defendants’ declarations were granted, including that the court had no jurisdiction to try the claim.

Practical takeaways

• Do not assume the other side’s solicitor is authorised to accept service: obtain clear written notification meeting CPR 6.7.
• Do not rely on email footers as a service solution; follow the CPR and PD 6A requirements (including checking any limits).
• If a firm specifies service mechanics (for example, a dedicated service email address and copying requirements), comply exactly.
• Avoid last-minute service: if limitation has expired, CPR 6.15 may not rescue an avoidable mistake.

“Liability is accepted”: when an insurer’s email can decide the case years later

In Industrial Maintenance Engineers (IME Contracts) Ltd v Webster Miller [2026] EWHC 393 (Comm), the High Court considered a common scenario in claims handling whereby an insurer engages at an early stage, communicates what appears to be an unequivocal admission, and later disputes indemnity. The decision highlights the potential ongoing effect of pre-action admissions for insureds, insurers and their agents. It also underlines that, following the CPR 14 amendments in October 2023, withdrawing such admissions may be more difficult than parties anticipate.

What happened?

IME claimed damages for structural damage at its warehouse during unloading operations in December 2021. The defendant, Webster Miller Ltd, was insured by GLI under a policy with a conduct of defence clause permitting the insurer to take over and conduct claims in the insured’s name. GLI instructed loss adjusters, Artemis, to investigate and handle the claim.

In January 2022, Artemis emailed IME stating that “the insurer has advised that liability is accepted”. GLI then made an interim payment, without reservation. In April 2022, GLI declined indemnity on the basis that the relevant equipment was not being used on a road, highway or public place.

Proceedings were issued in August 2024. IME treated the January 2022 email as a binding pre-action admission under CPR 14 and applied for summary judgment on liability. The defendant argued the email was not binding or should be withdrawn.

The court held the January 2022 email “plainly” amounted to an admission of liability. Objectively construed, it would be understood as conceding liability, leaving only quantum.

Arguments that the email was “without prejudice” failed, although there had been earlier settlement discussions, the judge found those negotiations had ended before the email was sent.

The conduct of defence clause did not assist the defendant. Read commercially and as a whole, the clause’s restriction on admissions applied to the insured, while the insurer retained authority to conduct and compromise claims in the insured’s name. GLI’s use of Artemis to communicate the admission therefore bound the insured defendant.

The court also accepted the admission undercut the defendant’s pleaded contributory negligence position, applying Maes Finance Ltd v AL Phillips Co [1997]: reopening contributory negligence would require revisiting liability issues already compromised by the admission.

A key issue was whether the post-October 2023 CPR 14 regime applied to withdrawing an admission made in January 2022. Relying on Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1105, the court treated the CPR 14 amendments as procedural, and therefore applicable to existing situations absent contrary intention. It distinguished authorities concerned with accrued substantive rights (including Yew Bon Tew and The Boucraa). It also rejected a “prejudice to fair trial” gloss derived from Walley, treating that case as reflective of the court’s former approach rather than the revised test.

Applying the factors in CPR 14.5, the court refused permission to withdraw. It emphasised that:

• the admission was deliberate and made by experienced claims professionals;
• there was no evidence it had been made in error;
• the defendant had relied on the admission in related proceedings against the insurer; and
• any claimed unfairness from the insurer’s later indemnity refusal was addressed by the (confidential) settlement of the defendant’s Part 20 claim against GLI.

Although the defendant had a real prospect of defending liability, those prospects were “no more than arguable”. Permission to withdraw was refused and IME obtained summary judgment on liability.

Practical takeaways

• Treat any pre-action “liability is accepted” message as potentially case-determinative; if the position is intended to be conditional or limited, say so expressly.
• Ensure loss adjusters, claims handlers and panel solicitors are aligned on communications, particularly where coverage may be in issue.
• For insureds, challenge early if you believe an insurer’s agent has gone beyond instructions; delay may make it harder to unpick later.
• If you need to withdraw a historic admission, assume the court will apply the post-October 2023 CPR 14 framework and build evidence around the CPR 14.5 factors.