"It's my property and I've got the WhatsApp messages to prove it"

Judgment was handed down recently in a High Court case that considered whether an exchange of WhatsApp messages could satisfy the requirements of the Law of Property Act 1925.

Maxine Reid-Roberts and Brian Burkee (as joint trustees in the bankruptcy of Audun Mar Gudmundsson) v Hsiao Mei-Lin and Audun Mar Gudmundsson [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) saw the Court decide whether an exchange of WhatsApp messages between a husband (Mr Gudmundsson) and wife (Ms Lin) was sufficient to dispose of the husband's beneficial interest in the family home.

Overview

Mr Gudmundsson and Ms Lin were in the process of getting divorced. They exchanged messages via WhatsApp in which they discussed their finances, and what would happen with their children, once their divorce had been finalised. In the messages, Mr Gudmundsson indicated that he was happy to "sign over" his share in the family home. Ms Lin responded by saying that she would "take" the home, return various paintings to Mr Gudmundsson, and then they were "done".

Mr Gudmundsson was subsequently made bankrupt. His trustees in bankruptcy had to ascertain whether he still owned a share in the family home. This brought the WhatsApp messages between Mr Gudmundsson and Ms Lin to the fore. Ms Lin argued that they were effective to transfer Mr Gudmundsson's share to her, and, therefore, his share did not form part of his estate in bankruptcy.

Mr Justice Cawson, however, held that the specific WhatsApp messages in question did not transfer Mr Gudmundsson's share in the property to Ms Lin. Nevertheless, Mr Justice Cawson confirmed that an exchange of WhatsApp messages could, theoretically, satisfy the relevant legal requirements for such a transfer.

Accordingly, an interest in land could potentially be transferred via WhatsApp, and this case sets out some guidance as to the specific circumstances in which such a transfer is likely to be effective.

Relevant law

The relevant law is found in Section 53(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which provides that:

(a) no interest in land can be created or disposed of except by writing signed by the person creating or conveying the same, or by his agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, or by will, or by operation of law…

(c)  a disposition of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the disposition, must be in writing signed by the person disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing or by will.

WhatsApp messages

The judgment set out the relevant WhatsApp messages in full, and they provide helpful context to the decision:

02.12.18

Mr Gudmundsson: "I suggest that the responsibility of taking care of the kids goes to u 100%, then I can sign over my share of southcote road to u without any complications as I don't need any accommodation in London."

Mr Gudmundsson: "Please let me know that u r happy with this and we can then close the financial part of the divorce this week."

03.12.18

Ms Lin: "with some monthly maintenance then ok."

Mr Gudmundsson: "It goes without saying the monthly maintenance for the kids in accordance with CMS."

Ms Lin: "Are you saying I have full custody of kids?"

Mr Gudmundsson: "Yes that is what I was saying, moving out of London for good and out of the kids life."

Ms Lin: "I will take house and full custody of kids. And my paintings [in] Iceland should be returned then is done."

Arguments before the Court

Mr Justice Cawson held that the WhatsApp messages did not show that Mr Gudmundsson intended to divest himself immediately of his beneficial interest in the property. Nonetheless, he went on to consider whether, assuming that Mr Gudmundsson had such an intention, the WhatsApp messages could have satisfied the requirements of Section 53(1) of the Law of Property Act.

It was Ms Lin's case that Mr Gudmundsson's name appearing in the relevant WhatsApp chat feed was sufficient to amount to Mr Gudmundsson's signature for the purposes of Section 53(1). She also argued that it did not matter whether he put his name there himself, so long as the intention behind the same was to authenticate the fact that the relevant WhatsApp messages came from him.

In opposition, Mr Gudmundsson's trustees in bankruptcy accepted that a WhatsApp message could be “writing” for the purposes of Section 53(1) and that a WhatsApp message could be regarded as "signed", but only if the name of the sender appeared in the body of the relevant message, i.e. in a similar way to a signature at the end of an email.

Agreeing with the trustees, Mr Justice Cawson found that a WhatsApp header was to be regarded "as incidental to the message" but not actually part of it. He then went on to conclude that the "necessary authenticating intent in relation to the heading was absent" and, therefore, the WhatsApp messages were not "signed" for the purposes of Section 53(1).

Implications

Based on Mr Justice Cawson's reasoning, it appears that an interest in land could be transferred via WhatsApp, provided that, in the relevant exchange of messages, each sender "signs off" the relevant messages with their names.

That said, irrespective of the above, it seems that any attempt to dispose of an interest in land via WhatsApp could be susceptible to challenge on other grounds – e.g. it may be debatable that the parties in question would have intended to create a binding legal relationship through such an exchange. In almost every case, a properly drawn up agreement, signed by both parties, will be a safer and more certain method of transferring property interests.

Given the proliferation of instant messaging applications, it seems likely that this issue will arise again at some point in the future. If it does, Maxine Reid-Roberts and Brian Burkee v Hsiao Mei-Lin and Audun Mar Gudmundsson provides an indication as to where the Court is likely to end up.